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ABSTRACT

Relative Performance Information, Advice-Seeking, and Trust in the Supervisor
BY
Ta-Tung (Stephanie), Cheng
April 27, 2020

Committee Chair:

Dr. Ivo Tafkov

Major Academic Unit:

School of Accountancy

Relative performance information (RPI) is commonly provided or available in many organizations. While RPI can
be viewed as a control that firms use to influence employee effort and performance, the presence of RPI may also
encourage employees to seek advice from the supervisor, which in turn breeds employees’ trust in the supervisor.
This study investigates how RPI influences employee advice-seeking as well as how such advice-seeking affects
trust in the supervisor. Using a laboratory experiment, I find that RPI motivates the non-bottom performing
employees (i.e. top and middle performers) to seek advice from their supervisor more frequently whereas the bottom
performing employees are not significantly affected by RPI to seek advice. I also find that the non-bottom
performing employees’ advice-seeking frequency positively influences their trust in the supervisor. Mediation
analysis reveals that RPI has a positive effect on the non-bottom performing employees’ trust in the supervisor and
this positive effect is mediated by their advice-seeking behavior. I discuss the implications of my findings for
accounting theory and practice.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Advice is the informational input from others that allows decision makers to consider
new information, to avoid mistakes, and to make better decisions (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). In
the workplace where information is incomplete, employees can benefit from seeking advice as it
often leads to an improvement in work performance, which in turn, benefits the organization
(Nadler et al. 2003). Prior studies show that employees frequently prefer to seek advice from
their supervisor rather than their peers because employees perceive their supervisor as more
knowledgeable (Morrison 1993; Nadler et al. 2003) and more capable of providing useful
information (Hanser and Muchinsky 1978; Greller and Herold 1975). It becomes crucial for
employees needing advice to proactively seek it because the supervisor might not be aware of
their problems or circumstances (Gibbons et al. 2003; Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). In this study, I
investigate whether and how the presence of relative performance information (RPI) influences
the extent to which employees seek advice from their supervisor.
It is important to study the effect of RPI on employee advice-seeking. Prior research
documents that RPI is often available in many organizations, and it motivates employees to
increase effort (e.g., Hannan et al. 2008; Tafkov 2013). However, a potential downside of RPI is
that it also motivates employees to withhold knowledge or share inaccurate knowledge with their
peers as RPI induces competitive behaviors among employees (Schnieder et al. 2018; Berger et
al. 2018). Assuming RPI reduces knowledge-sharing among competing employees, seeking
advice from a supervisor becomes pivotal as a supervisor can provide an efficient venue for
employees to acquire useful information that helps to improve their work performance.
Therefore, I investigate whether the presence of RPI may motivate employees to seek advice
from their supervisor.
1

In addition to studying the effect of RPI on employee advice-seeking, I examine how
advice-seeking influences the relationship between employees and the supervisor. Specifically, I
investigate whether advice-seeking allows for the development of trust in the supervisor, which
is an important dimension in employee-supervisor relationships. Employees’ trust in the
supervisor is crucial (Fulk et al. 1985; Dirk and Ferrin 2002) as Edelman Trust Barometer (2019)
indicates that “Investing in employee trust is investing in your bottom line.”. Prior literature also
reveals that trust in the supervisor positively influences employees’ perceived fairness of
performance evaluation (Fulk et al. 1985), organizational citizenship behavior (Dirks and Ferrin
2002), and task performance (Colquitt et al. 2007). Forbes (2017) points out that one of the
challenges which managers face today is establishing a relationship of trust with their
employees; thus, information or methods for inducing trust is necessary. As such, knowing
whether advice-seeking may cultivate a trusting relationship provides firms with relevant
implications regarding how RPI may be utilized to foster employees' trust in the supervisor.
I draw on psychology theory to predict that the presence of RPI will motivate employees
to seek advice from their supervisor more frequently. Prior literature shows that RPI has a
motivational effect on employee effort and performance, even when employees’ compensation is
not tied to the performance of their peers (e.g., Hannan et al. 2008; Tafkov 2013). According to
Social Comparison Theory (Festinger 1954; Suls and Wheeler 2000), the motivation effect
occurs because individuals have a drive to compare themselves to others and are eager to
maintain a positive self-image. To increase the chances of achieving a better ranking, employees
are likely to go the extra mile and solicit useful information from others. To the degree that
advice-seeking behavior can be viewed as an additional costly action toward searching for useful
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information, employees are more likely to seek advice from their supervisor when RPI is present
compared to when RPI is absent.
I also posit that employees who receive RPI will display more trust toward a supervisor
and this effect operates through the frequency of advice-seeking. Supervisors often provide
useful information; therefore, by seeking advice, employees have the opportunity to reap the
benefits of useful information. Due to Fundamental Attribution Error theory (Ross 1997),
employees are likely to attribute to some extent the supervisor’s behavior of providing useful
information to dispositional factors (i.e., supervisor’s trustworthiness), instead of situational
factors (i.e., the supervisor’s job responsibilities or duties). As employees will at least partially
attribute the supervisor’s behavior to her inherent trustworthiness, I contend that trust in the
supervisor is likely to be engendered by employee advice-seeking.
To test my hypotheses, I conduct an experiment in which I manipulate between-subjects
the presence of RPI (absent vs. present). Undergraduate students are assigned to the role of
Employee, and a graduate student is assigned to the role of Manager. There are two stages in the
experiment. In stage 1, employees make a series of production decisions across multiple rounds
in order to maximize profit. In the RPI absent condition, employees are informed of their
individual performance information. In the RPI present condition, employees are informed of
their individual performance as well as the relative performance ranking. Employees in all
conditions are given the opportunity to seek advice from their manager who possesses useful
information about the task. Employees are paid with the earned profits and thus, in my setting,
employees’ compensation is not tied to the performance of their peers. The manager is paid with
a fixed pay. The primary dependent variable in stage 1 is the frequency of advice-seeking.
Participants maintain their roles in stage 2 and are introduced with an investment game (Berg et
3

al. 1995; Garrett et al. 2019). The investment game is utilized in order to capture employees’
trust in the supervisor. Specifically, I employ a strategy method and ask employees to indicate
the amount that they are willing to invest if they are selected to receive an endowment from the
experimenter. Employees are also asked to estimate the percentage of return that they believe the
manager would share with them. The primary dependent variable is the expected percentage of
return, which is a proxy for employees’ trust in the supervisor (Garrett et al. 2019).
Results show that the employees seek advice from the supervisor more frequently when
RPI is present compared to when RPI is absent. However, this result is driven by the non-bottom
performing employees (i.e., top and middle performers) whereas bottom performing employees
are not significantly influenced by RPI to seek advice. The frequency of advice-seeking also
positively influences the non-bottom performing employees’ trust in the supervisor. Specifically,
the presence of RPI has a positive effect on their trust in the supervisor and this positive effect is
mediated by the frequency of advice-seeking.
This study has implications for both accounting research and practice. First, the study
contributes to accounting research on advice-seeking. Prior research in accounting focuses on
how individuals give advice (e.g., Leiby 2018) as well as how individuals weigh advice (e.g.,
Kadous, Leiby, and Peecher 2013). Very few studies have investigated what factors influence
employee advice-seeking (e.g., Brooks et al. 2015; Schaefer 2013; Morrison 1993). This study
sheds light on employee advice-seeking by identifying a common institutional factor - the
presence of RPI that influences employees’ decision to seek advice. While previous literature
emphasizes how RPI affects interaction among competing peers (Wang 2017; Black et al. 2018;
Berger et al. 2018; Schnieder et al. 2018), this study seeks to demonstrate that RPI also
influences the interaction between employees and the supervisor, thereby suggesting that the
4

effect of RPI may be broader than previously documented in the literature. Specifically, while
RPI may be perceived as a control that firms provide to influence employee effort and
performance (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and be viewed as harmful to trust among employees
(e.g., Schnieder et al. 2018), my study shows that RPI can also foster employees’ trust in the
supervisor by encouraging employees to seek advice. Therefore, this paper adds to the stream of
literature that investigates how controls may also be utilized to build trust within organizations
(Coletti et al. 2005; Garrett et al. 2019).
Finally, my results suggest that firms that provide RPI may consider offering additional
mechanisms or incentives to encourage the bottom performing employees to seek advice as they
are the ones who are most in need of advice but are least motivated by RPI to do so. For
example, instead of merely providing information, the supervisor can offer extra assistance
regarding how to utilize the information. This additional communication is important as although
bottom performing employees may be aware that the supervisor can provide useful information,
their poor rankings may prevent them from seeking advice due to lower self-efficacy regarding
their ability to utilize such information. As advice-seeking helps to foster a trusting relationship
within an organization, firms that do not provide RPI may consider offering other mechanisms
that encourage employee advice-seeking.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I present the theory and
hypotheses. In Section III, I describe the experimental design. The results are discussed in
Section IV. Section V concludes.

5

II.

THEORY DEVELOPMENT

Advice-Seeking
In the workplace, job-related information is often incomplete, and employees often lack
the information necessary to perform their work more effectively and efficiently (Morrison 1993;
Nadler et al. 2003). Such job-related information or work knowledge can also be difficult to
acquire through mere observation. Additionally, some important information may only be
available to the supervisor and employees do not always have access to such information.
Seeking advice thus becomes pertinent to employees’ success in the organization as it helps
employees to facilitate the fulfillment of job requirements or to achieve excellence in their
positions.
Prior literature finds that employees frequently seek advice from their supervisor rather
than their peers (Morrison 1993; Nadler et al. 2003). Employees typically perceive that their
supervisor is more knowledgeable and possesses information that helps to reduce the level of
uncertainty faced by employees. As employees usually have a better understanding regarding
when they need advice, it is crucial for employees who need advice to proactively seek advice.
Furthermore, the supervisor can be wary of providing unsolicited advice (Gibbons et al. 2003;
Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). Unsolicited advice is often perceived as intrusive, and knowing this
hostile potential, people are hesitant to give unsolicited advice (Gibbons et al. 2003). Unsolicited
advice is also often discounted more frequently than solicited advice, and knowing this possible
discounting effect, people are less willing to give effortful, unsolicited advice (Bonaccio and
Dalal 2006).

6

Despite the benefits as well as the importance of advice-seeking, employees are
reluctant to seek advice even when they need it. Particularly, Brooks et al.’s (2015) experiment
reveals that people withhold their action of seeking advice as they are worried about appearing
incompetent. It is important to understand how firms can motivate employees' effort to seek out
useful information from the supervisor, as advice-seeking tends to require additional effort. One
potential way is by providing RPI, as prior studies have suggested that RPI motivates additional
costly action (e.g., effort) (Hannan et al. 2008; Tafkov 2013).
Relative Performance Information
RPI provides employees with information about how they perform on a task relative to
other employees and is common in various organizations (Nordstrom et al. 1990; Song et al.
2019). In my setting, employee compensation depends on individual performance and is
independent from relative performance. As employees' compensation is not tied to the
performance of their peers, conventional economic theory would predict that the presence of RPI
will not influence employees’ effort or their advice-seeking behavior. (Frederickson 1992;
Hannan et al. 2008). However, RPI may act through a behavioral mechanism that influences
employee advice-seeking.
Prior literature shows that RPI has a motivational effect on employees’ effort and
performance even when their compensation is not tied to the performance of peers (Hannan et al.
2008; Tafkov 2013). According to Social Comparison Theory, this motivational effect arises as
individuals try to compare themselves favorably with others and desire to keep a positive selfimage (Festinger 195; Suls and Wheeler 2000). While economic theory suggests that people only
compete for monetary rewards, social comparison theory argues that people also compete for
non-monetary rewards such as performance pride and self-image (Smith 2000). Individuals exert
7

a higher level of effort when RPI is present as they seek to compare favorably to others and to
maintain a positive self-image. For example, Tafkov (2013) shows that RPI encourages
employees to increase effort. Song et al. (2018) also demonstrate that providing physicians with
public RPI motivates their effort in learning the best practice. In Chan’s (2018) experiment
where workers can invest in costly overtime work, the author finds that RPI encourages more
overtime work. Building upon prior literature, I posit that employees will be attentive to RPI
provided to them and will have a drive to improve their rankings even when their compensation
is not tied to the ranking. To increase their chances of achieving a higher rank, employees with
RPI are more likely to seek useful information from the supervisor compared to employees
without RPI.
In summary, advice-seeking requires effort and RPI motivates such effort. I draw on prior
literature and contend that the presence of RPI will motivate employees to seek advice more
frequently.
H1: Employees will seek advice more frequently when RPI is present compared to when
RPI is absent.
Advice-Seeking and Trust in the Supervisor
Supervisors often provide useful information to their employees (Hanser and Muchinsky
1978; Greller and Herold 1975). I contend that such useful information can influence
employees’ trust in their supervisor. When employees seek advice and the supervisor provides
useful information, employees can attribute this behavior (i.e., providing useful information) to
either dispositional (e.g., the supervisor’s trustworthiness) or situational factors (e.g., the
supervisor’s job responsibilities and duties). Prior studies show that individuals tend to over
attribute others’ behavior to dispositional characteristics than to situational factors due to
8

Fundamental Attribution Error (Ross 1997). For example, Coletti et al. (2005) and Garrett et al.
(2019) provide evidence that control-induced cooperation leads to perceived trustworthiness of
the collaborators despite the fact that the cooperation is induced by the control system. I argue
that when the supervisor provides useful information, employees will at least partially attribute
this behavior to the supervisor’s inherent trustworthiness instead of the supervisor’s job
responsibilities or duties. Consequently, employees are likely to perceive the supervisor as
trustworthy.1
I further contend that the frequency of advice-seeking positively influences employees’
trust in the supervisor. The reason is that, by seeking advice, employees are able to develop a
reinforcing belief regarding the supervisor’s trustworthiness through the repeated interactions.
Prior literature reveals that a trusting relationship may evolve from repeated interactions
(Gabarro 1978; Gulati 1995). Specifically, the trusting relationship between employees and the
supervisor may derive from repeated interactions through which expectations are formed and
beliefs are reinforced (Gabarro 1978). Such expectations yield a knowledge-based trust, which is
a perception that the interacting partner will continue to behave in accordance with the
expectations (Gulati 1995). In a similar vein, Coletti et al. (2005) suggest that individuals update
their perception of the partner’s trustworthiness based on their interaction histories. Garrett et al.
(2019) also document that one’s trusting belief in an interacting partner depends on the amount
of cooperation with the same partner in prior interactions. Provided that the supervisor imparts
useful information and employees at least partially attribute this behavior to the supervisor’s
trustworthiness, repeated interactions allow employees to form a history and reinforce their

1

Using a laboratory experiment, Özer et al. (2018) find that information sharing as well as advice
provision leads to trust in the party who shares such information.
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perception of the supervisor’s trustworthiness. As such, the frequency of advice-seeking
positively influences the extent to which employees judge the supervisor to be trustworthy.
H2: The frequency of advice-seeking will positively influence the extent to which
employees judge the supervisor to be trustworthy.
H1 predicts that RPI motivates employees to seek advice from the supervisor and H2
predicts that the frequency of advice-seeking positively influences employees’ trust in the
supervisor. Combining these arguments, I predict that the effect of RPI on trust in the supervisor
is positive and will be mediated by employee advice-seeking.
H3: Employee advice-seeking will mediate the relation between RPI and trust in the
supervisor.
It is worth noting that without advice-seeking, the mere presence of RPI may adversely
affect the perceived trustworthiness of a supervisor. Indeed, RPI establishes a competitive
environment that makes individuals perceive other people as untrustworthy (Black et al. 2018;
Berger et al. 2018; Schnieder et al. 2018; Sassenberg et al. 2007). For example, Sassenberg et al.
(2007) find that the competitive mindset induced by RPI has a carry-over effect on others who
were not involved in the competition. As a result, in the absence of advice-seeking, the mere
presence of RPI may have a negative impact on trust in the supervisor.
The predictions are graphically presented in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here
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III.

METHOD

To test the hypotheses, I use a between-subject experimental design. The experiment is
computerized using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). There are two stages in the
experiment. In stage 1, I manipulate the presence of RPI (absent vs. present) and observe
employees’ advice-seeking behaviors. In stage 2, employees perform an investment game, in
which I apply a strategy method to solicit responses regarding employees’ trust in the supervisor.
See Figure 2 for the experimental timeline.
Insert Figure 2 here
Participants and Procedure
Participants in this study are undergraduate and graduate students from a large public
university in the United States. There are ten participants in an experimental session, consisting
of nine employees and one manager who serves as a control throughout experimental sessions. I
run 6 sessions with nine employees each, resulting in 54 observations in total.
All participants are informed that undergraduate students are assigned to the role of
Employee and the graduate student is assigned to the role of Manager. Instead of assigning roles
based on performance-based criteria, this role assignment process allows me to better test my
theory by proactively preventing employees from viewing the manager as a competitor before
the experiment begins. As Douthit and Majerczyk (2019) suggest that employees’ perception of
the manager’s legitimacy can influence their subsequent behavior, assigning a graduate student
to a senior role also helps maintain the fairness of the assigning process and establish the
perceived legitimacy of the role in a lab environment.
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Because characteristics of the advisor may influence individuals’ perceptions of role
legitimacy and their decisions to seek advice (Brooks et al. 2005, Heikensten & Isaksson 2019),
the role of Manager is played by the same graduate student2 in all experimental sessions to serve
as a control. Doing so also allows me to reduce the noise that may arise in different sessions if
the roles are played by different individuals.
At the beginning of each experimental session, all participants are seated at their
respective individual computer terminals in the lab. Next, participants are instructed to sign a
consent form, read the instructions, and take a quiz to ensure that they understood the
instructions. Then, they work on the experimental tasks. After finishing the tasks, participants
answer a post-experimental questionnaire that contains some questions related to their decision
process and demographic information. At the end of each session, participants are paid their
earnings from the experiment in US dollars.
Experimental Task
In stage 1, the experimental task is adapted from Sprinkle (2000). Specifically,
employees make a series of production quantity decisions across multiple rounds in order to
maximize the amount of Lira (an experimental currency) earned in the experiment. As shown in
Figure 3, the amount of Lira earned for a production decision is determined jointly by production
quantity decision and the economic condition. The economic condition ranges from 1 to 20 with
equal probability and remains constant for each of the five periods within a round. While the
economic condition may vary across rounds, each participant faces the same set of economic

2

The same graduate student attends all experimental sessions and thus is aware of the manipulations. The
manager’s behavior is not the purpose of this study and her response is also not included in the analysis.
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conditions in the same order3. Participants are also informed that they face the same set of
economic conditions.
Insert Figure 3 here
Employees are given 220 seconds to complete the five periods in a round. The 220
seconds include 180 seconds of decision time and 40 seconds of feedback-viewing time. At the
end of periods 1, 2, 3 and 4 within a trial, employees are given 10 seconds to view the feedback
on their past performance. Specifically, they can see the amount of Lira they earn from each of
their previous decisions within that round. Such information allows employees to make
inferences regarding the unknown economic condition for that round. The 40 seconds (=10
seconds x 4 times) of feedback-viewing time is mandatory and a clock is displayed on the
computer screen. Employees are given the opportunity to practice the task before they proceed to
the real task.
RPI Manipulation
In the RPI absent condition, the manager sends individual performance feedback to each
employee at the end of each trial. Specifically, the manager sends individual feedback regarding
the sum of the total Lira each employee has earned in all rounds that s/he has completed. In the
RPI present condition, the manager sends individual performance information to each employee
as well as each employee’s relative performance ranking on the experimental task. Because there
are nine employees in a session, employees are ranked from 1 to 9 based on the sum of the total
Lira each employee has earned compared to that earned by the other eight employees4.
3

To enhance experimental control, I randomly selected the economic condition for each round before the
experiment sessions.
4
If there is a tie between two employees, the computer determines their relative rankings by adding a
random number. This same logic applies to a tie among multiple employees.
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Employees are able to view their own ranking as well as fellow employees’ rankings from their
computer screens. See Figure 4 for the example.
Insert Figure 4 here

Advice-Seeking
During stage 1 of the experiment, employees in all conditions are given the opportunity
to seek advice from the manager. Employees are made aware that their manager possesses useful
information which could help them narrow the range of the economic condition of each round.
While the economic condition ranges from 1 to 20, advice, if sought, can cut this range to 8. For
example, if the economic condition in a given round is 11 and an employee chooses to seek
advice, s/he would receive a message such as “The information I have suggests that the economic
condition of the current round ranges from 5 to 12”. If advice is sought, an employee could
make better inferences regarding the unknown economic condition. Hence, the advice, once
sought, should help employees avoid making mistakes and enhance the quality of their decisionmaking process.
Before employees make their first output quantity decisions, they are asked whether they
want to seek advice for a given round. Each employee has five opportunities to seek advice
within a round– (1) before making the 1st period decision (2) before making the 2nd period
decision, (3) before making the 3rd period decision, (4) before making the 4th period decision,
and (5) before making the 5th period decision. Since the economic condition remains constant for
each of the five decision periods, employees are allowed to seek advice only once per round.
See Figure 5 for five intervals during which employees could seek advice within a round.
14

Insert Figure 5 here
Employees are informed that because the economic condition varies from round to round,
the advice sought also varies from round to round. However, employees who seek advice receive
the same advice as the other advice-seeking employees within a given round. Employees who
request advice receive the same advice to ensure that the quality of advice remains constant to all
advice-seeking employees, thus ensuring that the ranking information is perceived as fair and
meaningful to the employees.
The manager is able to identify which employee has sought advice as well as how many
times each employee has sought advice. Specifically, the manager receives a summary at the end
of each round regarding how many times each employee has sought advice. Employees are also
informed that the manager receives such a report. The purpose of this design choice is to
implement the social cost of advice-seeking. Also, in reality, the advisor often can identify who
has sought advice. Employees, on the other hand, are not able to observe their peers’ adviceseeking behaviors. Doing so allows me to have a stronger manipulation of RPI because if the
employees could observe their peers’ advice-seeking behaviors, their advice-seeking behaviors
may also be influenced by their peers5.
Employees are compensated based on their performance on the experimental task plus
any time bonus. The performance on the experimental task is the sum of the total Lira that an
employee has earned over the six rounds. Additionally, an employee earns $0.01 for every 5
seconds that s/he finishes a round before 220 seconds has expired. If an employee chooses to
seek advice, his or her screen would be frozen for an additional 15 seconds. The remaining time

5

As such, their advice-seeking behavior may be driven by peer effect, RPI, or both.
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affects how much time bonus an employee could get in each round. The time bonus mechanism
is utilized to make advice-seeking costly.
Employee compensation = Sum of the total Lira + Time Bonus
The manager’s compensation is a fixed pay and, thus, is not tied to the performance of
employees.
The primary dependent variable is the frequency of advice-seeking. Recall that each
employee is given the opportunity to seek advice once per round. As there are six rounds in stage
1, the maximum amount of advice one may have received is six. The frequency of adviceseeking is calculated using the following formula:
Frequency of Advice Seeking =

𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒
6

❖ The number of times an employee has sought advice ranges from 0 to 6 for each
employee.
❖ The maximum number of times an employee can seek advice is 6.
Investment Game
In stage 2, participants maintain their roles and are introduced with an investment game.
Specifically, participants are told that one of nine employees would be randomly selected to
receive an endowment of 500 Lira. The selected employee can keep the endowment or invest in
a project being conducted by the manager. Each Lira that employee invests results in three Lira
of return. Employees are informed that the manager has the right to keep all of the returns from
the investment, but the manager also has the choice to share any amount of the returns with the
employee. Specifically, the manager is given the opportunity to share a percentage of the return,
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ranging from 0% to 100%. The manager makes her sharing percentage decision before the
employee is selected.
I apply a strategy method to solicit responses regarding employees’ trust in the
supervisor. Each employee is asked to indicate how much s/he would be willing to invest
(Invest), if s/he were to be selected. Each employee is also asked to estimate the percentage of
return (Expected_ Return) that s/he believes the manager would share with him/her. Employees
are clearly informed that the manager is not made aware of their responses to either question.
Each employee is told that his/her response to the investment amount will be the real investment
if s/he is selected to receive an endowment. The primary dependent variable is the expected
percentage of return, which is a proxy for an employee’s trust in the supervisor (Garrett et al.
2019).
The employee’s compensation in stage 2 is calculated using the following formula:
(1) If the employee is selected to be endowed with 500 Lira
Employee Compensation = 500 Lira – Investment + Total Return x Percentage of
Return
❖ Investment ranges from 0 to 500 Lira.
❖ Percentage of Return ranges from 0% to 100%, and is determined by the manager.
(2) If the employee is NOT selected to be endowed with 500 Lira
Employee Compensation = 0

The supervisor’s compensation in stage 2 is calculated using the following formula:
Manager Compensation = Total Return x (1 – Percentage of Return)
❖ Total Return = Investment x 3
❖ Percentage of Return ranges from 0% to 100%, and is determined by the manager.
17

IV.

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics
A total of 54 undergraduate students participated in the experiment. The undergraduate
students’ average age was 19 years old, and 56 percent were female. Risk attitude and general
trusting level were captured before participants started the experimental task. T-tests for meancomparison indicate insignificant differences on GPA, gender composition, risk attitude, and
general trusting level between the two conditions (all p-values > 0.10, two-tailed).
Test of H1
H1 predicts that employees will seek advice more frequently when RPI is present
compared to when RPI is absent. As reported in Table 1, Panel A, employees seek advice more
often when RPI is present (average in RPI condition = 3.81 times or 63.58 percent of times)
compared to when RPI is absent (average in No RPI condition = 2.48 times or 41.36 percent of
times). T-test for mean-comparison is significant (t= 1.94, p=0.029, one-tailed), providing
support for H1.
Recognizing that firms may be particularly interested as to whether RPI may motivate the
bottom performing employees to seek advice as they are the ones who are most in need of
advice, I further categorize employees into two groups – non-bottom performing employees and
bottom performing employees – based on their relative performance in stage 1. Employees who
are ranked 1 to 6 are non-bottom performing employees and employees who are ranked 7 to 9 are
considered bottom performing employees. I then separately examine the effect of RPI on adviceseeking within these two groups of employees.
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Table 1, Panel B shows that the non-bottom performers seek advice more often when RPI
is present (average in RPI condition = 5.33 times or 75.93 percent of times) compared to when
RPI is absent (average in No RPI condition = 3.50 times or 49.07 percent of times). T-test for
mean-comparison indicates that the effect of RPI on advice-seeking is significant for the nonbottom performers (t= 1.93, p=0.031, one-tailed).
Table 1, Panel C presents the result for the bottom performers. Bottom performers seek
advice on average 2.33 times (or 38.89 percent of the times) when RPI is present and 1.56 times
(or 25.93 percent of the times) when RPI is absent. T-test for mean-comparison shows that the
effect of RPI is insignificant for the bottom performers (t= 0.76, p=0.230, one-tailed).
Insert Table 1 here
Thus, although the initial analysis suggests that RPI motivates employees to seek advice
from the supervisor, additional analyses reveal that the positive effect of RPI on employee
advice-seeking is driven by the non-bottom performing employees. It also reveals that the bottom
performing employees are not particularly motivated by RPI to seek advice from the supervisor6.
Test of H2
H2 predicts that the frequency of advice-seeking positively influences the extent to which
employees perceive the supervisor to be trustworthy. Table 2 reports the result from an ordinal
logistic regression with expected return as the dependent variable and the frequency of advice-

6

When RPI is absent, non-bottom performing employees seek advice more often than the bottom
performing employees (on average 3.5 times versus 1.56 times) but the difference is not significant
(t=1.39, p=0.18, two-tailed). When RPI is present, non-bottom performing employees seek advice more
frequently than the bottom performers (on average 4.56 times versus 2.33 times) and the difference is
significant (t=2.30, p=0.03, two-tailed).
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seeking as the independent variable. The effect of advice-seeking frequency is significant (𝑥 2 =
1.32, p=0.094, one-tailed).
As tests of H1 reveal that the effect of RPI on advice-seeking is driven by the non-bottom
performing employees, I further test the effect of advice-seeking frequency on the non-bottom
performing employees’ trust in the supervisor. The result suggests that the effect of adviceseeking frequency on the non-bottom performers’ trust in the supervisor is significant (𝑥 2 = 2.31,
p=0.011, one-tailed). On the contrary, advice-seeking frequency has no significant impact on the
bottom performers’ trust in the supervisor (𝑥 2 = - 0.28, p=0.392, one-tailed). Simply put, adviceseeking frequency positively influences the non-bottom performers’ trust in the supervisor but
does not influence the bottom performers’ trust in the supervisor.
Insert Table 2 here
It is worth noting the possibility that individuals who possess a natural inclination to trust
others may expect the manager to share a higher percentage of return regardless of the frequency
of advice-seeking. To rule out this explanation, I control for the general trusting level that is
measured before the experimental task is introduced. Result that is not tabulated shows that
advice-seeking frequency continues to positively influence the non-bottom performing
employees’ trust in the supervisor (𝑥 2 = 2.61, p<0.01, two-tailed) after controlling for their
general trusting level7.
Because participants’ compensation in stage 1 is tied to their individual performance,
non-bottom performing employees who perform better and thus accumulate more wealth may be

7

Participants indicate their responses to the six statements that are used to measure their general trusting
level. For example, “Most people are basically honest.”, “Most people are trustworthy.”, “Most people are
basically good and kind.”
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more willing to invest a higher amount in stage 2 and subsequently expect a higher percentage of
return from the manager. As a result, the higher expected return may be driven by the higher
investment amount. To rule out this explanation, I control for the Investment amount. Result that
is not tabulated shows that advice-seeking frequency continues to positively influence the nonbottom performers’ trust in the supervisor (𝑥 2 = 2.06, p=0.04, two-tailed) after controlling for the
non-bottom performing employees’ investment amounts.
To understand whether advice-seeking frequency influences the degree to which nonbottom performing employees display work-related trust to the manager and/or feel more
attached to the manager, I analyze the effect of advice-seeking on Work_Trust and Attachment
respectively. Specifically, I measure Work_Trust by asking employees to answer "Would you
trust working with this manager again?” using a Likert scale of 1-7 with 1 being not at all and 7
being very much. I measure Attachment by asking employees to use a Likert scale of 1-7, with 1
being not at all and 7 being very much, to indicate their response to the following statement
"Please rate the extent to which you felt attached to your manager”. Table 3 presents the ordinal
logistic regression results that show non-bottom performing employees who seek advice more
frequently indeed display more work-related trust to the manager ( 𝑥 2 = 2.93, p<0.01, two-tailed)
as well as feel more attached to the manager (𝑥 2 = 4.11, p<0.01, two-tailed).
Insert Table 3 here
Test of H3
H3 predicts that employee advice-seeking will mediate the relation between RPI and trust
in the supervisor. To test the mediation, I first follow Barron and Kenny (1986)’s causal
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procedures and rely on multivariate regression analyses. I subsequently test mediation using the
Sobel test as well as confidence intervals8.
Table 4, Panel A presents the regression results for all employees. Panel A, Model 1 tests
the total effect of RPI on expected return and shows an insignificant result (β=-0.009; p=0.493,
one-tailed). This insignificant result is not surprising under an inconsistent mediation, meaning
the direct effect has an opposite sign to the indirect effect. As suggested in Figure 1, although
RPI might have a positive effect on trust in the supervisor through advice-seeking, the mere
presence of RPI might have a negative effect on trust in the absence of advice-seeking. As such,
Baron and Kenny (1986) point out that the total effect can be insignificant with an inconsistent
mediation. Panel A, Model 2 tests the effect of RPI on advice-seeking frequency and Panel A,
Model 3 tests the effect of advice-seeking frequency on trust. These results show that although
RPI encourages employees to seek advice (β=0.875; p=0.041, one-tailed), advice-seeking
frequency has a marginal impact on trust (β=0.744; p=0.094, one-tailed). Panel A, Model 4
further shows that the frequency of advice-seeking has a marginal impact on trust in the
supervisor after controlling for the presence of RPI ((β=0.853; p=0.08, one-tailed). Overall, these
analyses lend a marginal support for the mediation relation.
Insert Table 4 here
However, tests in H1 and H2 reveal that the effect of RPI on advice-seeking is driven by
the non-bottom performing employees. It is possible that the mediation relation exists for the

8

I followed Arnold and Artz (2015)’s paper and use causal method as well as Sobel test (p.70). I supplement my test
results with confidence interval tests. I use 90% confidence interval test because the distribution of a^b^is skewed
and that an assumption of normality will lead to inaccurate probability statements. I follow Chen and Bargh (1997)’s
method and use 90% confidence interval instead.

22

non-bottom performing employees only instead of all employees. I then test the mediation for the
non-bottom performing employees.
Table 4, Panel B presents my results. Specifically, Panel B, Model 1 tests the total effect
of RPI on expected return and shows an insignificant result (β=0.23; p=0.351, one-tailed). The
insignificant total effect is expected with an inconsistent mediation where direct and indirect
effect has an opposite sign. Panel B, Model 2 tests the effect of RPI on advice-seeking frequency
for the non-bottom performing employees and suggests that they are motivated by RPI to seek
advice (β=1.102; p=0.042, one-tailed). Panel B, Model 3 tests the effect of advice-seeking
frequency on trust and shows that advice-seeking frequency positively influences the non-bottom
performing employees’ trust in the supervisor (β=1.663; p=0.011, one-tailed). Finally, Panel B,
Model 4 reveals that the frequency of advice-seeking significantly affects trust even after
controlling for the presence of RPI (β=1.949; p=0.009, one-tailed). Taken together, these results
fulfill the conditions described by Baron and Kenny (1986) for the mediation. As suggested by
Baron and Kenny (1986), I additionally test whether the indirect effect from RPI over adviceseeking to trust in the supervisor is significantly different from zero by performing a Sobel test
(Goodman 1960). I find evidence for a significant effect (p<0.10). I further test the indirect effect
using bootstrapping with 1,000 bootstrapped samples. Figure 6 presents the results.
Bootstrapping analysis indicates that the 90% confidence interval for the indirect effect of RPI
on trust through advice-seeking is entirely above zero (lower bound = 0.264; upper bound =
11.446). The result is similar if I test the indirect effect using the Monte Carlo method (lower
bound = 0.317; upper bound = 10.390). To sum up, my analyses suggest a mediation relation
between RPI and trust in the supervisor for the non-bottom performing employees.
Insert Figure 6 here
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V.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I study the effect of RPI on employee advice-seeking as well as the impact
of advice-seeking on trust in the supervisor. I find that while the bottom performing employees
are not particularly motivated by RPI to seek advice, the non-bottom performing employees seek
advice more frequently when RPI is present compared to when RPI is absent. Additionally, the
frequency of advice-seeking positively influences the extent to which the non-bottom performing
employees display trust in their supervisor. Mediation analyses suggest that advice-seeking
mediates the relation between RPI and trust in the supervisor for the non-bottom performing
employees.
My study contributes to accounting theory and practice in several ways. First, this study
fills the gap of current RPI literature by investigating whether and how the presence of RPI also
influences the interaction between employees and their supervisor. My study also adds to the
stream of literature that examines how a control system may influence trust within organizations.
This study gives an implication to practice by suggesting that firms that provide RPI may
consider offering additional incentives (e.g., recognition) or assistance to encourage the bottom
performing employees to seek advice as they are less motivated by RPI to do so but are most in
need of advice.
My study also suggests several opportunities for future research. First, employees can learn
by seeking advice or by trial-and-error and it may be beneficial to investigate whether employee
performance varies given different learning strategies and whether the effectiveness of learning
strategies depend on task characteristics. Second, my results reveal that RPI did not have a
significant effect on the bottom performing employees’ advice-seeking behavior. Future research
is necessary to identify factors which motivate bottom performers to seek advice and/or factors
24

which prevent them from seeking advice. Third, in some situations, employees may observe their
peers’ advice-seeking behavior, which further influences their own decisions in seeking advice.
Future research may benefit from investigating how such peer effect influences employee adviceseeking. Finally, future studies may benefit from an investigation evaluating how the perceived
cost of providing or seeking advice influences advice-seeking. According to prior literature, when
people seek advice they consider not only personal costs such as time and effort, but also the
potential advisor’s cost of giving advice. Examining how the cost of seeking and giving advice
affects whether or when an employee seeks advice from the advisor may be a worthwhile pursuit
considering the established value and importance of advice seeking within an organization.
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Figure 4
Example of Ranking Information
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Figure 5
When Can Employees Seek Advice?

STAGE 1
Practice Session
Main Session
Advice-Seeking Unavailable
Advice-Seeking Available
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6

Period 1

1

Round 1
Period 3

Period 2

2

3

Period 4

4

Period 5

5

Any employee has five opportunities to seek advice within a round if s/he has
never sought advice in any previous periods within that round.
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Figure 6
Mediation Analysis for the Non-bottom Performers

A= 1.102
p= 0.042

RPI

Frequency of
AdviceSeeking

C= 0.230
p= 0.351

B=1.949
p= 0.009

Trust in the
Supervisor

C’= - 0.525
p= 0.222

Note: All p-values are one-tailed. Process uses ordinal logistic regression when assessing links with an
ordinal dependent variable.

Confidence interval for the indirect effect:
(a) Bootstrapping

Indirect Effect

Lower Bound
0.264

Upper Bound
11.446

Lower Bound
0.317

Upper Bound
10.390

(b) Monte Carlo Method

Indirect Effect

* Presented confidence interval is based on a 90% confidence level.
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Table 1
Test of H1
Panel A: Frequency of Advice-Seeking - Mean (SD)
Frequency of AdviceSeeking (times)

Frequency of AdviceSeeking (percentage)

NO RPI
2.48
(0.48)
N=27

RPI
3.81
(0.49)
N=27

T-test
1.94
p = 0.029

41.36%
(0.41)
N=27

63.58%
(0.43)
N=27

1.94
p = 0.029

NO RPI
3.50
(0.52)
N=18

RPI
5.33
(0.11)
N=18

T-test
1.93
p = 0.031

49.07%
(0.46)
N=18

75.93%
(0.6)
N=18

1.93
p = 0.031

NO RPI
1.56
(0.55)
N=9

RPI
2.33
(0.87)
N=9

T-test
0.76
p = 0.230

25.93%
(0.28)
N=9

38.89%
(0.43)
N=9

0.76
p = 0.230

Panel B: Non-Bottom Performers
Frequency of AdviceSeeking (times)

Frequency of AdviceSeeking (percentage)

Panel C: Bottom Performers
Frequency of AdviceSeeking (times)

Frequency of AdviceSeeking (percentage)

Note:
1. T-test for mean comparison is appropriate as it compares the mean of advice-seeking frequency.
2. Frequency of Advice-Seeking (times) indicate how many times an employee has sought advice in
stage 1 and the number ranges from 0 to 6.
3. I calculate Frequency of Advice-Seeking (percentage) by dividing Frequency of Advice-Seeking
(times) by 6.
4. All p-values are one-tailed due to directional prediction.
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Table 2
Test of H2
Panel A: The Effect of Advice-Seeking Frequency on Trust Proxied by Expected Return
Wald 𝒙𝟐

p-value

All Employees

1.32

0.094

Non-Bottom Performers

2.31

0.011

Bottom Performers

-0.28

0.392

Note:
1. All p-values are one-tailed due to directional prediction.
2. Expected Return is an ordinal dependent variable that ranges from 0 percent to 100 percent with 10
percent as an interval.
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Table 3
Non-Bottom Performers
Panel A: The Effect of Advice-Seeking Frequency on Work Trust

Non-Bottom Performers

Wald 𝒙𝟐

p-value

2.93

<0.01

Panel B: The Effect of Advice-Seeking Frequency on Attachment

Non-Bottom Performers

Wald 𝒙𝟐

p-value

4.11

<0.01

Note:
1. All p-values are two-tailed.
2. Work Trust – Participants are asked "Would you trust working with this manager again?” on a seven-point
Likert scale anchored at 1 = “Not at all” and 7 = “Very much”.
3. Attachment – Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they feel attached to the manager on a
seven-point Likert scale anchored at 1 = “Not at all” and 7 = “Very much”.
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Table 4
Test of H3
Panel A: All Participants
Model
Dependent
Variable
RPI

1.
Expected Return

2.
Frequency of
Advice-Seeking

-0.009
(0.493)

0.875*
(0.041)

Frequency of
Advice-Seeking

Observation

3.
Expected Return

4.
Expected Return

-0.267
(0.305)
0.744
(0.094)

0.853
(0.080)

54

54

54

1.
Expected Return

2.
Frequency of
Advice-Seeking

3.
Expected Return

4.
Expected Return

0.230
(0.351)

1.102*
(0.042)

54

Panel B: Non-Bottom Performers
Model
Dependent
Variable
RPI

Frequency of
Advice-Seeking

Observation

36

36

-0.525
(0.222)
1.663*
(0.011)

1.949**
(0.009)

36

36

Note:
1. To test ordinal dependent variables, I use ordinal logistic regression.
2. p-values are shown in the parentheses and are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction.
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